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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON HARRIS and
PE.AHL A. HARRIS,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
12619

EULA TILLEY,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STA TEl\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiffs brought action against defendant in
District Court, Case No. 188517, to recover amounts
expended for repairs made to defendant's property and
management fees incurred during defendant's absence
from the State of Utah, during which time plaintiffs
managed and maintained the property which is the
subject of this appeal. To obtain the money for the
repairs, the plaintiffs co-signed with defendant on a
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promissory note and defendant gave them a quit-claim
deed to secure the note for plaintiffs. The trial court
found the quit-claim deed to be a security and not a deed
absolute. The court awarded the plaintiffs a money
judgment and gave plaintiffs a mortgage against defendant's property to secure the judgment.
Plaintiffs then sued in District Court, Case No.
192613 to foreclose on the above mortgage. They were
awarded a Decree of Foreclosure, and the property was
sold to the plaintiffs at Sheriff's sale. Defendant duly
filed her claim for a homestead exemption and moved
the court to determine that the plaintiffs' foreclosure
was subject to her homestead exemption.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY
LOWER COURT
The lower court rendered its conclusions of law
and judgment on July 27, 1971, determining that the
quit-claim deed given by the defendant was not an
equitable mortgage within the scope of Sections 28-1-1
and 78-23-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that
defendant's giving of said quit-claim deed did not constitute a waiver and relinquishment of her right to a
homestead exemption incident to the foreclosure.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to sustain the Order protecting
the defendant's homestead interest from execution and
sale.
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STATEl\IE:\TT 0.F FACTS
In July, 190.J., defendant, Eula Tilley, owned her
home at HHi8 South 8th East, Salt Lake City, Utah,
which was dear except for back taxes. ( R. 20, L3-4).
On October 5, 1965, defendant quit-claimed her
property to plaintiffs, Layton Harris and Pearl A.
Harris. The quit-claim deed. was used as security by the
plaintiffs for co-signing a loan from First Federal Savings an<l Loan Association, who then loaned plaintiffs
$6,.500.00. The $6,500.00 was paid to the plaintiffs and
used for making improvements to and for the remodeling of defendant's home in their capacity as property
managers of defendant's property, while defendant
remained outside the State of Utah. Plaintiffs collected
rent from defendant's property which was to be used for
income, repairs and to retire the loan. (R. 19, Ll4 - R.
20 L3; R. 37; L:W-22; R. 39 LS-9). All of the repairs
to defendant's property were done by plaintiff, Mr.
Harris, who is a licensed contractor, and his two sons.
(R. 26, Lll-16).
In May, 1!)67, plaintiffs, without notice to defendant, recorded. the quit-claim deed and obtained a loan
on defendant's property, payable to themselves, in the
amount of $!J,OOO.OO. (R. 29, LIS - R. 30, L4). This
second loan from First Federal Savings and Loan entirely retired the balance due on the note for $6,500.00,
and the balance was placed in plaintiffs' personal account. ( R. 55, L20-27). All of the monies loaned were
paid to, received bv, and controlled by plaintiffs.
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Upon defendant's return to Utah, she moyed into
her property and shortly thereafter, plaintiffs sued defendant, as a tenant of plaintiff's property, in eviction
for unpaid rent, Case No. 188517, Third District Court
Salt Lake County, Utah.
'
At the trial in Case No. 188517, the court declared
title to the property to be defendant's and gave plaintiffs a money judgment against defendant in the amount
of $10,876.91, for their repair and remodeling costs
incident to said property. The court also granted plain·
tiffs a mortgage against defendant's property to secure
the amount of the judgment. (R. 6).
Plaintiffs then foreclosed on the said lien by filing
a separate action, Case No. 192613, to foreclose the
mortgage. The court awarded a decree of foreclosure
and the property was sold at Sheriff's Sale to the plaintiff's. Defendant duly filed her declaration of homestead
and moved the court to determine that the plaintiff's
foreclosure was subject to her homestead exemption.
(R. 1).
The judge who heard District Court Case No.
188517 was the same judge who heard the arguments
and passed judgment granting defendant her homestead
exemption in the combined cases Nos. 188517 and
192613. (R. 4-8).
In case No. 188517, in plaintiff's pleading, "Reply
to Counterclaim,'' plaintiffs prayed for, " ... a judg·
ment establishing an equitable lien in the plaintiffs
... '', and against the defendant's property. The issue
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was before the court and the court awarded plaintiffs
a money judgment instead and granted the plaintiffs a mortgage against the property to secure the
money judgment. Appeal was taken by defendant in
Case No. 188517, but not on the issue of an equitable
mortgage against the homestead. Plaintiffs made no
appeal, nor did they pray for an equitable lien against
the homestead in the relief sought in their Respondents'
Brief in the said appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE HOMESTEAD IS AN ABSOLUTE
RIGHT THAT EXISTS BOTH IN THE HEAD
OF FAMILY AND IN THE FAMILY; AND
THE \VHOLE \VORLD IS PLACED ON NOTICE OF THIS RIGHT THROUGH THE
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE
XXII, §1 AND THE HEAD OF FAMILY ACTS
AS A TRUSTEE :FOR THE PROTECTION OF
THE RIGHTS OF THE OTHER MEMBER
OR MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY. THUS,
ALIENATION OF THE HOMESTEAD MUST
BE VOLUNTARY, KNOWLEDGEABLE, CONSCIOUS, SPECIFIC AND EXPRESS.
It is very clear from the facts that defendant owned
the subject home free and clear except for a tax lien,
prior to the granting of the first loan on October 5,
1965. It is also very clear from the facts that the pur-
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pose and use of both loans was that of a contractor
materialman, laborer, and/or mechanic in the repair~
and remodeling of defendant's home.
The contractor in this case was the plaintiff, Mr.
Harris, who was a licensed contractor and did contract
for all of the repairs and remodeling to defendant's
property, and hired his two sons to perform the work
thereon. (R. 26, Lll-16).
Plaintiffs' claim against defendant is for the repair
costs, which repairs .Mr. Harris performed while managing the property for defendant.
At best, plaintiffs have a mechanic's type lien
against defendant's property, which does not defeat
defendant's homestead exemption.
The Homestead Exemption is created in Article
XXII, §1, of the Utah State Constitution, and is an
absolute right. Kimball v. Sal,isbury, 17 Utah 381, 53
Pac. 1037, (1909), and Panogopulos v. lf'lanning, 93
Utah 198, 69 P.2d 614 (1937).
All laws relating to the absolute right of the homestead exemption, Kimbal,l v. Salisbury, Supra, must be
liberally and broadly construed to protect the homestead and make it effective for its purpose. In re:
Mower's Estate, 93 Utah 390, 73 P.2d 967, (1937);
Folsom v. Aspen, 25 Utah 299, 71 Pac. 315 (1902);
and Panogopulos v. Manning, Supra.
The purpose and intent of the homestead was to
protect the home for the family as against acts of the
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family which would deprive the family of the exemption
without any element of knowledge or consent on the
part of the family. Volker-Scowcroft Lumber v. Vance,
et al, 32 Utah 74, 88 Pac. 896, (1907). "Homestead
rights are not founded upon equity. They are founded
upon public policy for the protection of the home . . ."
Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, et al, Supra
at 85.
In the present case, we have the plaintiffs co-signing
on a promissory note for $6,500.00. The purpose of the
note was to repair and remodel the plaintiff's house
(Appellants' Brief, Pg. 3), and the contractor who performed those repairs and the remodeling was the plaintiff, Mr. Harris. ( R. 26, L 11-16) . Plaintiffs received a
quit-claim from defendant to be used as security for
the loan and not as a deed absolute or a mortgage which
could have as easily been prepared. (R. 45-46.)
Plaintiffs then used the quit-claim deed as a deed
absolute, recorded it and obtained a second loan for
$9,000.00, without the knowledge of the defendant.
(R. 29, LIS - R. 30, L4). Plaintiff's relationship to
defendant at this time was that of property managers,
a fiduciary relationship, and that of contractor, for
the repairs and remodeling of defendant's premises.
Now the plaintiffs wish to invoke the court's equity
to establish the quit-claim deed as an equitable mortgage
that is an exception to the homestead exemption.
In Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, et al,
Supra, the court deals with the specific point in question
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and states unequivocally that unless the homestead as
such is consciously and specifically impaired by the
owner in an express writing, the Constitution protects
the homestead from any judgment, lien, execution or
forced sale.
While the Constitution has placed no inhibition to a voluntary alienation of a homestead it
has specifically exempted it, without excepti~n
from all involuntary or execution sales ... th~
Constitution has not prohibited a homestead
claimant from selling or involuntarily incumbering the homestead, and he may make any kind of
voluntariy alienation of it, or incumber it ...
Now, it may be said that the defendant, the homestead claimant, having herself voluntarily made
and entered into the contract for the construction
of the building on the homestead, and the material having been furnished by plaintiff in pursuance of it, therefore, she voluntarily incumbered the homestead the same as though she had
given a mortgage upon it. That would be true
if by the terms of her contract she had pledged
the homestead, or had given a lien on it [the
homestead] as by law provided. But it is not made
to appear that the contract contains any stipulation giving contractors, materialmen, laborers,
mechanics or any one a lien upon the homestead,
and nothing oppears from which the c?ntract can
be construed into a contract for a lzen. In the
absence of an express contract creating it, the
lien which a materinlman or mechanic may become entitled to depends solely upon the statute
for its existence. V olker-S cowcroft Lumber Co.
v. Vance, Supra, (emphasis added).
The court stated the title to the property remained
vested in the defendant, and, without more, the judg·
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ment claimed by plaintiffs is, at most, a mechanic's lien,
a creature of statute, and homesteads are exempt from
judgment and foreclosure of mechanic's liens. Stucki
v.Ellis, 114 Utah 486, 201P.2d486, (1949), following
Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, Supra, and
Utah Builders Supply Co. v. Gardner, 86 Utah 257,
42 P.2d 989, ( 1935).

POINT II
IN ORDER FOR AN EQUITABLE LIEN
TO BE ESTABLISHED, OVERT ACTS ON
THE PART OF THE PERSON CLAIMING A
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION MUST BE IN
EVIDENCE WHICH DEMONSTRATE THAT
THE PARTY CONSCIOUSLY INTENDED TO
ENCUMBER THE HOMESTEAD IN THE
WAY, MANNER AND TO THE EXTENT SO
ENCUMBERED.
The first loan that the parties were involved in was
in the amount of $6,500.00. It was for this loan that the
plaintiff signed a quit-claim deed. The first loan might
have been construed to be an equitablet mortgage, but
the second loan for $9,000.00 cannot. The second loan
was solely that of the plaintiffs. The second loan was
taken out by the plaintiffs without the knowledge or
consent of the defendant. (R. 29, LIS - R. 30, L4).
The second loan also completely retired and terminated
the first loan. It also terminated any contract the parties
may have had. The plaintiffs also waived any rights
they may have had to an equitable mortgage by their
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subsequent conduct, which eliminated the first loan and
security agreement (quit-claim deed) , as between the
plaintiffs and defendant, thereon.
In equity the court looks to the intent of the parties.
If the conduct of the parties is to be believed, the plaintiffs only received a mechanics lien, the same as any
contractor for repairs made.
How can an equitable mortgage, if there be one, in
the form of a mechanic's lien, be stronger that a purchase
money mortgage, which is protected by statute as an
exception to the homestead exemption?
"Purchase money" has been defined by case law
to be money actually used in, and for the purchase of
land. If the purchase money includes monies for other
indebtedness, only that portion thereof traceable to the
purchase money, stands ahead of the homestead exemption, and no other. McMurdie v. Chugg, 99 Utah 403,
107 P.2d 163 (1940).
The plaitniffs now on appeal ask that the court
grant them a mortgage against the homestead in the
amount of $10,876.91, because they received a quitclaim deed to secure a mechanic's lien for $6,500.00. The
plaintiffs wish this court to construe the quit-claim
deed to be an express waiver of homestead contrary to
Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, et al., Supra,
and they wish this court to extend an equitable mortgage
to any and all indebtedness of defendant, contrary to
this court's rules of construction in purchase money
mortgages. McMurdie v. Chugg, Supra.
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POINT III
A JUDG.MENT RENDERED, WHICH HAD
AS ISSUE, EITHER THROUGH THE PLEADINGS AND/OR EVIDENCE, THE QUESTION
OF THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION AND
WHERE THE ISSUE OF THE HOMESTEAD
WAS NOT PURSUED BY THE MOVING
PARTY, THE FIRST JUDGMENT IS RES
JUDICATA AS TO THE ISSUE OF HOMESTEAD, IN ALL SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS.
In Bell v. Jones, 104 Utah 306, 139 P.2d 884,
( 1943), the court states that an execution or order of
sale may not go beyond the terms of the judgment upon
which it is based. In Case No. 188517, plaintiffs' Reply
to Defendant's Counterclaim prays for an equitable lien
on the premises in favor of the plaintiffs. The court
awarded a money judgment instead. The order was
entered June 16, 1970. Plaintiffs made no appeal from
the money judgment. The plaintiffs, in their pleadings,
obviously claimed an equitable lien on the constitutionally protected homestead in an attempt to defeat the
homestead exemption. They had the right and opportunity to appeal the court's decision to grant a money
judgment. They failed to pursue their right of appeal
and the matter is res judicata and a bar to them in any
action to establish an equitable lien subsequently. 46
Am J ur.2d, §382, et seq.
If the homestead is in the pleadings and evidence,
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and there is judgment without appeal, the judgment
is res judicata on the question of homestead.
"Either the judgment ... was a lien upon the land
in controversy or it was not ... If the land constituted
a homestead, there was no lien ... To hold that it was
a lien without first determining the question as to
whether it is such property as is subject to a lien by
the plain provisions of the homestead statute, is to give
a judgment creditor a right in addition to what is given
him by the statute." Antelope Shearing Corral v. Consolidated Wagon and Machine Co., 54 Utah 355, 180
Pac. 597 ( 1919).

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully submits that plaintiff's
judgment mortgage was simply a mechanics-type lien,
which by law cannot defeat a homestead. Defendant
did not voluntarily relinquish or pledge her homestead
rights, nor did the court determine that the judgment
mortgage superseded the homestead based on pleadings
and evidence. Therefore, defendant is entitled to her
homestead exemption.
Respectfully submitted,
DALE J. CRAFT
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent
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